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PART I
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: 
“HISTORY IS ON THE MOVE”
José Colen and Bryan-Paul Frost
Although Aron believed that a “sociological” approach to war (and peace) was possible, and even necessary, he also argued that the absence of “val-
ues” in that approach or description would greatly impoverish—indeed, com-
pletely distort—it. This does not mean that all approaches and descriptions are 
equivalent or of equal worth: reason may not be able to appreciate the complex 
arrangements of an international system using a single criterion, but this does 
not mean that it should gratuitously relinquish its own powers. Simply put, war 
can be understood from a variety of better and worse perspectives, but it is never 
“value-free.” It is therefore no surprise that Aron was skeptical of the hoped-for 
convergence between political theory and economic science through the use of 
such concepts as the “logic of choice,” “the principle of balance,” or “quanti-
tative variables.” The economic model of politics “does not offer a simplified 
or schematic portrait of political conduct, as it deforms and falsifies this same 
conduct.” Of course, political scientists were free to define and to use whatever 
models they liked (provided they were tested a posteriori); but any model that 
did not take account of the subjective meaning that political, diplomatic, and/or 
military agents ascribed to their conduct would not ref lect reality and so would 
not exemplify or comport with an authentic political science. Even if the eco-
nomic model is used simply as a heuristic tool, it still runs the risk, “under the 
pretext of defining an abstract theory,” of suggesting a cynical interpretation of 
politics as the sole truth.
Each of the chapters in this part tries—as Aron himself tried—to avoid these 
pitfalls. In the fi rst place, they present a sociological analysis of a diplomatic or 
historical constellation without being value-free. In the second place, they present 
a genuinely political analysis and show that history and war cannot be reduced to 
economics (or any other such “rigorous” science) without fundamentally distort-
ing them. All of the chapters therefore focus largely on the intersection between 
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history and praxeology, and how each informs the other. Aron was one of the 
few international relations theorists who put praxeology at the forefront of his 
analysis, but only because he had so carefully surveyed the historical landscape 
(and vice versa).
Jean-Vincent Holeindre’s chapter explores Aron’s writings on war and strat-
egy. Holeindre begins by reminding us of the essentially interdisciplinary char-
acter of Aron’s oeuvre. This is apparent from even a cursory glance at the table 
of contents of his massive work Peace and War, which comprehensively analyzes 
international relations by systematizing theory, sociology, history, and praxeol-
ogy. As Holeindre reminds us, Aron was the fi rst to introduce into France a 
sociological theory of international relations, refusing to reduce such a crucial 
project to the study of history or legal rules (although he integrated these two 
topics into his analysis as well). Holeindre also fi nds room for the applicability 
of Aron’s observations to the state of war today. Aron had a great deal to say 
about the decisive eff ect that atomic weapons had on diplomacy in his era, but 
he also recognized the impact of psychological and guerrilla warfare, terror-
ism, and irregular confl icts—as waged, for example, by the Algerians and the 
Vietnamese.
In the next chapter, Matthias Oppermann argues that we should understand 
Aron’s spirited defense of liberal democracy in light of his experience of the 
convulsions of German politics and society in the 1930s. For Aron’s sojourn in 
Germany from 1930 to 1933 had not only introduced him to a wide array of 
important German thinkers, it had also underscored the fundamental fragil-
ity of liberal democracy, especially in France, and thus awakened him from his 
pacifi st slumber and brought him back to French Republican patriotism. His 
commentary during the lead-up to the Second World War was a plea to his 
countrymen—and to any defender of liberal democracy more generally—for 
them to demonstrate the bravery and resolution necessary to conserve their cur-
rent political system, however great its faults, in the face of the much greater 
threat of tyranny. Aron also discovered after the war that “history was again on 
the move,” and he would spend much more time and eff ort rephrasing and reiter-
ating his stance on totalitarianism in order to deal with its deceptively friendlier 
incarnation.
Raymond Aron’s ongoing commentary on the Cold War is the topic of Carlos 
Gaspar’s chapters. Here Gaspar makes extensive use of Aron’s works on histoire-
se-faisant, including his many articles published in Le Figaro and L’Express. Aron’s 
versatility in political commentary, sociology, international relations, and phi-
losophy placed him at a unique vantage point from which he could survey the 
unfolding of history little by little and integrate these details within a broader 
vision of the main trends of the twentieth century in particular and his philoso-
phy of history in general. Gaspar confi rms the validity of Aron’s central insights 
into the nature of the Cold War: decolonization brought about the end of the 
old empires, and while the rivalry between the West and the Soviet Union never 
erupted into nuclear war, it nevertheless remained a “bellicose peace.” Even 
though the liberal democracies began to reveal problems of their own, namely, 
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a diminished capacity for collective action, Aron had faith that the confl ict 
between the West and the Soviet Union would result in liberty.
Peace and War among Nations is clearly Aron’s masterpiece in the fi eld of inter-
national relations, and Bryan-Paul Frost seeks here to unpack its main tenets. 
Beginning with Aron’s rich historical analysis, Frost shows that although the 
twentieth century was unique (what with nuclear weapons and the worldwide 
extension of the diplomatic fi eld), it could still be understood by using the same 
conceptual tools used previously—most notably, those elaborated by Clausewitz 
and others. In fact, Frost shows that Aron did not believe that nuclear weapons 
had eff aced traditional notions of diplomatic, strategic, and moral conduct: the 
Machiavellian and Kantian dilemmas faced in the past were the same ones faced 
in the present. Consequently, Aron’s theoretical and sociological framework was 
equally applicable during the Cold War as it had been in the past.
Joël Mouric discusses Aron’s gradual discovery of Clausewitz, as well as the 
many misinterpretations and injustices from which both the German strategist’s 
magnum opus, Vom Kriege, and what one might also call Aron’s magnum opus, 
Penser la guerre, Clausewitz, suff ered. Although it is a shame that Aron did not 
write the great work expected of him on Marx, his opting for Clausewitz as the 
subject of a major study should come as no surprise: both Clausewitz and Aron 
had lost their homelands for some time during a war; moreover, of all the think-
ers Aron had dealt with, Clausewitz most accurately fi t the description of a man 
who made critical decisions and who withdrew to ponder the nature of his fi eld. 
In Aron’s in-depth study of that man we are made privy to the various facets of 
Aron’s thinking that justify this Companion: the relation between knowledge or 
theory and action; the interweaving of process and drama; the need to explain 
how our era is both fundamentally the same and fundamentally diff erent (for 
Clausewitz the new factor was Napoleon and total war; for Aron it was nuclear 
weapons); the desire to mitigate the increasingly destructive eff ects of war, even 
if it is inevitable.
Carlos Gaspar rounds off  this part with a chapter on Aron and the end of the 
Cold War, an end that caught everyone by surprise, but would have comforted 
Raymond Aron.
